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Abstract: We control using bright light an actively-quenched avalanche
single-photon detector. Actively-quenched detectors are commonly used
for quantum key distribution (QKD) in the visible and near-infrared range.
This study shows that these detectors are controllable by the same attack
used to hack passively-quenched and gated detectors. This demonstrates
the generality of our attack and its possible applicability to eavsdropping
the full secret key of all QKD systems using avalanche photodiodes
(APDs). Moreover, the commercial detector model we tested (PerkinElmer
SPCM-AQR) exhibits two new blinding mechanisms in addition to the
previously observed thermal blinding of the APD, namely: malfunctioning
of the bias voltage control circuit, and overload of the DC/DC converter
biasing the APD. These two new technical loopholes found just in one
detector model suggest that this problem must be solved in general, by
incorporating generally imperfect detectors into the security proof for QKD.
OCIS codes: (270.5568) Quantum cryptography; (040.1345) Avalanche photodiodes (APDs);
(270.5570) Quantum detectors.
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1. Introduction
Over the past twenty years, quantum key distribution (QKD) has progressed from a tabletop
demonstration to commercially available systems [1], with secure key exchange demonstrated
up to 144 km in free-space [2] and 250km in optical fibers [3]. Security of these cryptosystems
is based on the impossibility, in principle, to reliably copy an a priori unknown quantum state,
as accounted for by the no-cloning theorem [4]. However, security also relies on the assumption
that the optical and electro-optical devices which are part of quantum cryptosystems do not
deviate from model assumptions made to establish security proofs [5, 6, 7, 8].
Recently, it has been demonstrated that both commercial QKD systems available on the mar-
ket in 2009 could be fully cracked [9, 10, 11]. A tailored bright illumination was employed
to remote-control gated avalanche photodiodes (APDs) used to detect single photons in these
QKD systems. Note that these publications raised discussions regarding technique’s applicabil-
ity to QKD systems from other developers [12, 13], as well as how such loopholes should be
tackled [14, 15, 16]. In another work, a full eavesdropper has been implemented on a research
system using passively-quenched APDs [17]. The overall purpose of the work reflected in this
paper is two-fold. First, we establish the generality of this attack, by extending its validity to
QKD systems employing actively-quenched APDs. Second, we demonstrated two new control
mechanisms in just one detector model (a commonly used commercial module, PerkinElmer
SPCM-AQR [18]). The latter finding supports the opinion that efficient countermeasures must
rely on a general security proof based on a sufficiently general detector model, as opposed to
incremental ‘intuitive’ technical patches.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we recap the general scheme of at-
tack which can in principle be implemented using this detector vulnerability. In sections 3–5,
we demonstrate that this particular detector, as other models tested before, fulfills the general
conditions proposed for 100% eavesdropping of the cryptographic key. We discuss counter-
measures in section 6, and conclude in section 7.
2. Proposed attack
From eavesdropper’s point of view, the intercept-resend attack provides a general framework
to exploit unaccounted non-idealities or operating modes of components. In this attack, we
assume that the eavesdropper Eve owns an exact replica of receiver Bob’s detection apparatus,
with which she intercepts and measures the state of each qubit sent by Alice. To successfully
eavesdrop, Eve must resend faked states [19] that will force her detection results onto Bob’s
in a transparent way. Ideally, the faked state should make the target detector click controllably
(with unity probability and near zero time-jitter) while keeping any other detector blind (no
click). In the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) [20] and similar four-state protocols, Bob must
detect two bit values in two bases, which can be implemented with two pairs of detectors. One
pair detects bit values “0” and “1”, and a second pair (not necessary with active basis choice)
detects in the conjugate measurement basis, which is randomly selected prior to detection of
each qubit in order to guarantee security against eavesdropping. Thus in 50% of the cases, the
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Fig. 1. Intercept-resend (faked-state) attack Eve could launch against a QKD system which
runs a four-state protocol with polarization coding and passive choice of basis [21, 22,
23, 24]. In the example, Eve targets the detector recording vertically polarized qubits in
the horizontal/vertical (H/V) basis. We assume here that detectors click controllably when
illuminated by an optical pulse with peak power ≥ Pth, and that they are blind (or kept
blind) at power ≤ Pth/2 (characteristics of the ‘blinding generator’ potentially needed to
bring detectors in this working mode will be described later). To address the target detector,
Eve sends a faked state with V polarization and power 2Pth, thus the V detector receives
power Pth after basis choice, and clicks. The detectors recording polarized qubits in the
conjugate (45◦-rotated, D/A) basis each receive a pulse of power Pth/2, and thus remain
blinded. In the diagram: BS, 50:50% beamsplitter; PBS, polarizing beamsplitter; HWP,
half-wave plate rotated 22.5◦.
qubit resent by Eve will be measured by Bob in the conjugate basis, resulting in a random
outcome. Similarly, if the photonic qubit is replaced by a classical pulse of peak power Pth, an
incompatible choice of basis will result in arrival of pulses of power Pth/2 at both detectors
[9, 17]. Let us now assume that under some conditions, detectors remain blind at power Pth/2
and click controllably at threshold power Pth. With the latter pulse, Eve can selectively address
the target detector without causing a click in the conjugate basis. This is illustrated in Fig. 1 in
the case of a QKD system running a four-state protocol with polarization coding and passive
choice of basis at Bob’s side. After Bob reveals in which bit slots he has registered detections,
Eve will have the same raw key bit sequence as Bob. Eve thus can extract the final secret key
by listening to the classical public communication between Alice and Bob and doing the same
post-processing operations as Bob [9, 17]. Thus, providing that the above assumption of the
detector threshold behavior is satisfied, QKD systems using such detectors are vulnerable.
Let us now explain how this assumption can be fulfilled. Most QKD systems today use
avalanche photodiodes (APDs) to detect single photons [25]. (The two notable exceptions
are continuous-variable QKD systems [26, 27, 28, 29, 30] and those using superconducting
detectors [3, 31, 32].) For single-photon sensitivity, APDs are operated in so-called Geiger
mode, i.e., they are biased above the breakdown voltage so that an absorbed photon triggers an
avalanche. (In case of gated-mode operation, the APD is biased above breakdown only during
the gate time to limit noise [9, 25].) The avalanche current is sensed by a comparator before
the avalanche is quenched to reset the diode. Quenching is achieved by lowering (passively or
actively) the bias voltage below breakdown [25]. In the latter condition, however, the APD is
no longer in the single-photon detection mode but behaves as a classical photodiode generating
photocurrent proportional to the optical illumination. It is thus insensitive to single photons, but
also to noise sources (dark counts, afterpulses). However, it is still possible to make the APD
click controllably since in this classical photodiode mode, the comparator threshold translates
to a classical optical power threshold Pth. Providing the threshold is well-defined, no click will
ever occur at power Pth/2, and Eve has at her disposal a very general attack for breaking the
security of most APD-based QKD systems.
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3. Blinding and controlling an actively-quenched single-photon detector
In the case of the two recently-hacked commercial QKD systems operating at telecom wave-
lengths [9], transition from Geiger to classical photodiode mode was achieved by using
continuous-wave (c.w.) bright illumination to reduce APD bias voltage below breakdown.
Equivalently, raising the breakdown voltage above the fixed bias voltage by heating the APDs
also led to blinding and control of the detectors [11].
In this paper, we illustrate further the generality of the attack by taking full control of a
commercial actively-quenched detector model PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR module [18]). Un-
til recently, the SPCM-AQR has been the only commercially available unit among actively-
quenched modules. The latter account for about half of the 28 QKD experiments using non-
gated detectors reported in the literature (the other half uses passively-quenched detectors) [33].
It thus makes the SPCM-AQR an obvious choice for testing. Moreover, such detectors may be
used after upconverting telecom-wavelength qubits into the visible and near-infrared range,
where Si modules have better detection characteristics [34]. Free-running, actively-quenched
InGaAs/InP APDs for telecom wavelenghts have also recently been introduced [35, 36]. Obvi-
ously, one would rather study security and control mechanisms of actively-quenched detectors
before (rather than after) they get incorporated into commercial QKD systems.
In the case of SPCM-AQR detector model, we achieved transition to classical photodiode
mode by applying not c.w. (as for gated detectors) but instead bright pulsed illumination at the
level of less than 10mW at ≥70kHz repetition rate. Between the pulses, the detector is blind to
single photons, and does not produce dark counts or afterpulses. However, it clicks controllably
if a classical light pulse ≥Pth is applied, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
4. Blinding mechanisms
Fig. 3(a) shows at which optical pulse frequencies blinding of the detector is achieved, and the
corresponding bias voltage at the APD. We identified three distinct mechanisms responsible
for blinding. Each mechanism is activated in a different range of control pulse frequencies, as
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Fig. 2. Oscillogram at detector output (lower trace) illuminated by bright optical pulses
(upper trace) made of control pulses (808nm, 8mW, 50ns wide, 800kHz repetition rate)
to blind the detector, and of weaker trigger pulses (8ns wide). The trigger pulses make
the detector click with unity probability and sub-nanosecond time jitter only above a cer-
tain power threshold. In the example, detector always clicks at Pth = 2.88mW peak power
trigger pulses, never clicks at ≤2.49mW.
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Fig. 3. Detector blinding: (a) APD bias voltage vs. frequency and peak optical power Pcontrol
of rectangular 50ns wide input optical pulses. Normal bias voltage at low count rate for this
detector sample is 410V (the other detector sample we tested had bias voltage of 350V).
Filled symbols denote pulse parameters at which the detector got completely blind between
the control pulses. (b) Parameters in the circuit vs. frequency of optical pulses with peak
power Pcontrol = 8mW. Behavior of these parameters reveals three blinding mechanisms
summarized over the top of the chart. The middle chart shows static voltage difference
between the inputs of opamp, controlling the APD bias voltage (as similarity of the two top
charts confirms). The lower chart shows current of the thermoelectric cooler (TEC) and the
temperature of the APD as measured by a thermistor mounted nearby at the cold plate of
the TEC.
6
APD
Detector
output
=
=
= =
+5 V
U6
EMCO 9546 R9
20k
CLC
~10 mA
SliK Buffer Comparator
1
35 ns
~30 pF?
R7
1M
C8
Quenching
circuit
+30 V 14 ns
20 ns
Q11
IRL520
Reset
circuit
50k
R24
2.61k
R23 100k
C3
adds≈1 V to APD bias voltage for every average 2 Mcounts/s at the output
T2
10.0M
C9
reference+
–
TLC2262AI
DQC
1.0
In normal operation,
C10
100n 10n
C11
10n
U7.1
Adjustable
voltage
Fig. 4. Simplified reverse-engineered circuit diagram of PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR mod-
ule. In normal operation, the cathode of the APD (superlow-k (SliK) type [37]) is biased
at a constant high voltage, stabilized by a feedback loop containing an opamp U7.1 (Texas
Instruments TLC2262), field-effect transistor Q11 and high-voltage DC/DC converter mod-
ule U6 (EMCO custom model no. 9546). The anode of the APD is connected to a detection
and quenching circuit (DQC). The DQC senses charge flowing through the APD during the
avalanche, then briefly connects the APD anode to +30V to lower the voltage across the
APD below breakdown and quench the avalanche. The APD anode voltage is subsequently
reset to 0V, and the detector becomes ready for the next avalanche. (Note: the circuit dia-
gram has been greatly simplified for the paper; do not use this figure for attempting detector
repair or modification.)
discussed below.
The first blinding mechanism corresponds to transition from Geiger to classical photodiode
mode by lowering the APD bias voltage below breakdown. As the frequency of optical pulses
increases, control first appears when the APD bias voltage drops by 12–15V (Fig. 3(a)). To
understand why it drops, let’s consider the detector electrical circuit depicted in Fig. 4. When
the APD is illuminated by a bright optical pulse, the current through it is not interrupted by
the detection and quenching circuit (DQC) and is much larger than during an ordinary single-
photon avalanche. A current limiting circuit (CLC) kicks in and limits the current pulse to about
10mA. This current is drawn from the capacitor C9, whose other end is connected to the output
of a low-power opamp U7.1. This opamp has a specified maximum load current significantly
smaller than 10mA. It gets overloaded by the current pulses, and unexpectedly develops a large
static voltage offset between its inputs (see Fig. 3(b), middle chart), which may be a behavior
specific to this particular opamp integrated circuit. Yet, this negative offset effectively adds to
the pre-set reference voltage at the opamp non-inverting input, and the feedback loop lowers
the APD bias voltage proportionally.
At higher control pulse frequencies ∼1MHz, however, the disrupted opamp gets back into
normal operation. At these frequencies, the duty cycle of the current pulses at the opamp output
gets closer to 1/2. Since the opamp output is AC-loaded, its sourcing peak current decreases
while its sinking peak current grows; they become close in magnitude and now apparently bet-
ter suit opamp load capability. As a result, its large input offset disappears and the circuit raises
the APD bias voltage back to the nominal value. Yet, the detector remains blind. This occurs
because the APD produces more heat through electrical power dissipated in it, as the frequency
of control pulses increases. In normal operation, the APD is cooled to −7 ◦C with a thermo-
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Fig. 5. APD package decapsulated: the cover and fibre coupling optics have been cut off.
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are mounted on the cold plate of a two-stage thermoelectric cooler (TEC). In the assem-
bled detector, the package base is in thermal contact with an aluminum detector outer case
serving as a heatsink.
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Fig. 6. Comparison of thermal blinding characteristics of the PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR
detector (a) to the ones reported for ID Quantique’s Clavis2 commercial QKD system [11]
(b). Filled symbols denote regime in which the detector got completely blind between the
control pulses. For the SPCM-AQR, characteristics at Pcontrol = 1mW are shown, because
at this power thermal blinding is the only blinding mechanism.
electric cooler (TEC), see Fig. 5. The TEC heat removal capability and maximum current are
inherently limited. As can be seen in the lower chart in Fig. 3(b), after a temperature controller
reaches the maximum TEC current, the APD temperature quickly rises. The raised APD tem-
perature in turn raises its breakdown voltage (by ≈1.2V/◦C) above the bias voltage, which
also leads to blinding. The same thermal blinding behaviour has been observed before [11]: the
detectors in the commercial QKD system Clavis2 operate at a different wavelength (1550nm)
and use gating instead of active quenching. Yet, as seen in Fig. 6, they have a similar response:
after reaching the maximum TEC current, the APD temperature starts increasing. Eventually,
after a sufficient increase in temperature, the detectors become blind. This temperature-induced
increase of the breakdown voltage makes thermal blinding an attack generic in principle to all
avalanche single-photon detectors.
At even higher pulse frequencies, the bias voltage drops again below breakdown, while the
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detector is still under control. This is due to load capacity exhaustion of the high-voltage DC/DC
converter U6 biasing the APD.
Above, we have demonstrated three distinct blinding modes in the SPCM-AQR detector
model [18]. Some QKD experiments [24] use a four-channel version of this detector module,
PerkinElmer SPCM-AQ4C [38]. Our preliminary analysis indicates that it has a different bias
control circuit that is not susceptible to the first blinding mechanism (opamp overload). How-
ever, it is likely susceptible to both thermal blinding and DC/DC converter overload, because it
uses the same APD package and the same model of DC/DC converter.
The data sheets of both detector models [18, 38] state that exposure to intense light will
reduce the count rate to zero. We could reproduce a similar effect with only one out of the
two SPCM-AQR samples we tested under up to 8–16mW peak power, both c.w. and pulsed at
various duty cycles and repetition rates. In that sample, a power-line monitoring circuit incorpo-
rated in the detector module (not shown in Fig. 4) powered down the entire detector for 1–1.5s
following a brief time period when it was forced to count at the saturation rate of ∼ 15MHz.
The detector produced zero counts while it was powered down indeed, then recovered. Another
peculiarity of the SPCM-AQR model is that if a weak c.w. illumination is present while it is
being powered up (when it either recovers as above or being manually powered up by the ex-
perimenter), the DQC would latch into a ‘forbidden logic state’ with a permanent logic high at
the detector output. The detector recovers instantly from this state when the c.w. illumination is
reduced below a certain level. (The SPCM-AQ4C circuit however seems to have no forbidden
logic states.) However, we could not get controllable clicks from the detector in these blinded
modes.
5. Side effects
There are many interesting changes that can be monitored in the circuit (Fig. 3), however the
only electrical signal an unmodified detector module currently provides to the QKD system is
the detector output signal (Fig. 4). The only side effect that betrays our attack at the detector
output are clicks caused by blinding pulses with a rate of at least 70 kHz (Fig. 2). In a general
case, these clicks may increase the quantum bit error rate (QBER) observed by the legitimate
parties, and a further analysis whether this attack would work is required. However, in many
QKD systems Eve can arrange for these clicks to be always ignored by the legitimate par-
ties as falling outside their post-processing gating time window. For instance, when attacking
an entanglement-based system [24] where Eve can intercept both photons of a pair, she can
arrange timing of the clicks caused by the blinding pulses to never register as coincidences be-
tween Alice and Bob. In this case, the control pulses will have zero contribution to the QBER.
Similarly, if the system uses a pulsed source [23, 39], the clicks can be timed to fall outside
Bob’s qubit time window and thus will not increase the QBER. In free-space systems operating
in daylight [22, 23], the clicks may be masked as a normal background count rate; note that the
blinding pulses can be irregularly spaced to make them look more like background counts. We
remark that the blinded state has some inertia (especially in the case of thermal blinding [11])
that should in principle allow Eve to apply the blinding pulses in bursts interleaved with quiet
periods when only the trigger pulses are applied.
Both APDs used in the present study died suddenly, after many days of extensive testing
during which they worked normally and showed no advance signs of the coming failure. This
may indicate that at least some of these control regimes reduce APD lifetime, although no
reliable conclusions can be drawn from our limited testing. A study of failure mechanisms
caused by bright light may be interesting, however it is much more challenging and expensive,
and thus lies completely outside the scope of this paper. While we have exceeded the absolute
maximum rating on the peak light intensity of the detector module [18], note that Eve is never
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limited by manufacturer’s specifications.
6. Countermeasures
The major difference between public-key cryptography and quantum key distribution is that
there are security proofs for the latter. However, these security proofs are based on models of the
devices used in quantum key distribution. The fact that bright illumination attacks are applicable
against a detector implementation, shows that this detector implementation is not within the
device model of any security proof. However, the abovementioned difference from the public-
key cryptography also requires loopholes to be closed differently than before. Rather than just
avoid the specific attack, one must alter the implementation and/or the security proofs to re-
ensure that the devices are within the models of the security proofs. Otherwise, the quantum
key distribution implementation is no longer provably secure, and thus has no advantage over
key distribution based on classical cryptography.
Countermeasures have been extensively discussed for gated APD-based detectors [9, 11, 12,
13, 40, 14, 15, 16]. That discussion shows clearly that avoiding specific attacks does not nec-
essarily re-establish security. The most frequently proposed countermeasure to prevent blind-
ing consists of using an optical power meter (or the APD itself as an optical power meter
[12, 14, 16]) with a classical threshold at Bob’s entrance [9, 12, 13, 14, 16]. For such a coun-
termeasure, the classical threshold for the optical power must originate from a more general
security proof [9], otherwise the provable security is not re-established. In fact, a recent study
[41] has shown that for gated APD-based detectors, control can be achieved with faint trig-
ger pulses containing less than 120 photons per pulse, already making the attack very difficult
to detect with an optical power meter. For gated detectors, the so-called “bit-mapped gating”
scheme [40] seems to make the implementation compatible with certain security proofs [7],
and may thus re-establish security. One possible way of further development down this path
would be to test single-photon sensitivity of Bob’s APDs at random times by a calibrated light
source placed inside Bob [40]. The results from this testing may then be used as an input to
a security proof that incorporates detector deficiencies and non-linearities [7]. Alternatively,
countermeasures for all detectors considered may also include monitoring the APD bias volt-
age, current and temperature [11], with the efficiency of each countermeasure to be assessed
in the framework of a general security proof. Although development of countermeasures has
begun [9, 40, 12, 42, 43], no definite countermeasure has been finalized and tested by hacking
at this time [13].
If one simply wishes to avoid the specific bright-illumination attacks without re-establishing
provable security, there are numerous options. One could replace the APD with a beamsplitter
distributing photons to two APDs, and to look for coincidences as a signature of eavesdropping.
One could also monitor any of the parameters presented in Fig. 3, or any other parameter such
as the background detection rate, revealing detector control attempts. However we don’t see
why anybody would then prefer this QKD system that is not provably secure, over cheaper and
much more convenient classical cryptography systems.
7. Conclusion
In view of this study, complemented by the ones made on other APD models [9, 10, 11, 17],
we estimate that most of the QKD systems existing today are potentially vulnerable to our
attack. The only ‘detector-dependent’ aspect here is the type of bright illumination (none, c.w.,
or pulsed) required to bring a particular APD into the classical photodiode regime. We remark
that very similar bright-light control method is also applicable to a superconducting nanowire
based single photon detector [44]. While we have not analysed actively-quenched detectors of
manufacturers other than PerkinElmer, the above experience suggests that there is a chance they
10
may be vulnerable to some of the already studied, as well as new yet-to-be-found blinding and
control mechanisms.
While bright-light detector control is, strictly speaking, not equivalent to the hack of a QKD
system, we note that for one of the APD models, a full eavesdropper based on bright-light
detector control has previously been implemented and tested under realistic conditions on a
290m experimental entanglement-based QKD system [17]. In view of this demonstration, we
consider that closing the exposed loopholes in a provable way should take precedence over
confirming that a full eavesdropper can be built for all APD models.
Our work emphasizes the need to investigate thoroughly vulnerabilities originating from
unaccounted physical non-idealities of QKD components.
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